74c7bf6ef7
Previously logout only destroyed our own session -- someone who
signed in via Authentik stayed logged into Authentik itself, so
"Sign in with Authentik" again would silently re-authenticate with
no prompt.
Session now tracks authMethod ("local" | "oidc") and, for OIDC
sessions, the raw id_token (needed as id_token_hint at logout time).
New GET /api/auth/oidc/logout redirects through Authentik's
end_session_endpoint (openid-client's buildEndSessionUrl, not
hand-rolled) before landing back on /. Must be a full-page navigation
-- Authentik needs a real browser request to clear its own session
cookie, a fetch() wouldn't do that. Local sessions still use the
existing POST /api/auth/logout unchanged.
Confirmed Authentik has no dedicated post_logout_redirect_uri
allowlist field by checking the provider's DB schema directly before
implementing, rather than assuming.
Closes #19.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
76 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
76 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
# Authentik OIDC setup
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Local auth (bcrypt + session, the saved Vaultwarden password) is always available.
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When `OIDC_ENABLED=true`, the login page additionally shows a "Sign in with Authentik"
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button — this is additive, not a replacement, so the existing admin login keeps working.
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## How the Authentik side was provisioned
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No API token or admin credentials were needed. Authentik supports **blueprints** —
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declarative YAML files it applies automatically — so the OAuth2 Provider + Application
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were created via `/opt/authentik/blueprints-local/homelab-monitor-oidc.yaml` on CT121,
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picked up by the `worker` container on startup. This is purely additive: it doesn't
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touch any existing user, group, or admin credential.
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- Blueprint volume mount added to `/opt/authentik/docker-compose.yml` (backed up as
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`docker-compose.yml.bak-homelab-monitor` before editing) for both `server` and `worker`.
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- Provider: confidential client, `default-provider-authorization-implicit-consent` flow
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(auto-approve — reasonable for a single-user personal dashboard), signed with
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Authentik's existing self-signed cert.
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- Redirect URIs (both registered): `https://monitor.jerodrigged.com/api/auth/oidc/callback` (primary,
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set in `.env`) and `http://192.168.1.103:8090/api/auth/oidc/callback` (LAN fallback, works if the
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tunnel/DNS is down).
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- Application slug: `homelab-monitor`.
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To change anything (redirect URI, flow, scopes), edit the blueprint file on CT121 and
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either wait for Authentik's file-watcher or `docker restart authentik-worker-1` — it
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re-applies on any change to the file.
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## Bug: LAN-IP issuer sent browsers somewhere they couldn't reach
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First deploy used `OIDC_ISSUER_URL=https://192.168.1.208:9443/application/o/homelab-monitor/`
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(Authentik's LAN IP) for discovery. Authentik's discovery document **echoes back whichever
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host you queried it through** — so `authorization_endpoint` came back as that same LAN IP.
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That value gets handed straight to the *browser* as a redirect target. Anyone off the LAN
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(or just not on wifi) got redirected to an address they couldn't reach at all — reported as
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"signed in via Authentik, got sent to the local IP, and it failed."
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Fix: Authentik was **already** publicly exposed at `https://auth.jerodrigged.com` (NPM proxy
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host id 9, predates this project) with a real Let's Encrypt cert — just wasn't the one used
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for `OIDC_ISSUER_URL`. Switched to it; `OIDC_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS` could then go back to `false`
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too, since it's not a self-signed cert. **Always use the public issuer URL for anything a
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browser is ever redirected through**, even though the app's own server-to-server calls
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(token exchange, userinfo, jwks — all made directly by the Node process, never by a browser)
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would have worked fine against the LAN IP too.
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## API-side implementation
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`apps/api/src/auth/oidc.ts` uses `openid-client` v6 with PKCE + state, with an optional
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insecure-TLS fetch override (`OIDC_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS`) for the rare case the issuer is
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LAN-only with a self-signed cert — not needed now that the issuer is the public URL, but
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kept since Authentik's LAN address still works as a fallback if `auth.jerodrigged.com` is
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ever unreachable. Routes in `apps/api/src/routes/oidc.ts`:
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- `GET /api/auth/oidc/login` — redirects to Authentik's authorization endpoint
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- `GET /api/auth/oidc/callback` — exchanges the code, sets `req.session.username` from
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the `preferred_username` (falls back to `email`, then `sub`) ID token claim, and stores
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`authMethod: "oidc"` + the raw `id_token` in the session
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- `GET /api/auth/oidc/logout` — RP-Initiated Logout (issue #19). Only takes this path if
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`req.session.authMethod === "oidc"` (a locally-authenticated session has no Authentik
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session to end); redirects through Authentik's `end_session_endpoint` with
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`id_token_hint` + `post_logout_redirect_uri` (via `openid-client`'s `buildEndSessionUrl`,
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not hand-rolled) before landing back on `/`. **Must be a full-page navigation, not a
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fetch** — the frontend does `window.location.href = ...`, since Authentik needs to see a
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real browser request to clear its own session cookie on `auth.jerodrigged.com`. Plain
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`POST /api/auth/logout` still exists for local sessions and just clears the local one.
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Authentik has no dedicated `post_logout_redirect_uri` allowlist field (unlike
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`redirect_uris`) as of the version this was built against — confirmed by checking the
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provider's DB schema (`\d authentik_providers_oauth2_oauth2provider`) before
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implementing, not assumed.
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## Credentials
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`OIDC_CLIENT_ID`/`OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` are in CT122's `.env` and saved in Vaultwarden
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alongside the local admin login.
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